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ARGUMENT
L

THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE COURT OF
APPEALS' DECISION AND HOLD THAT A LENDER SHOULD GIVE
CREDIT TO A GUARANTOR FOR PAYMENTS THE GUARANTOR
MAKES ON A LIMITED GUARANTY

A guarantor does not need to enter into an agreement with a lender to ensure that
the lender apply the guarantor's payments towards his limited personal guaranty. The
Court of Appeals has adopted a rule in this State which prohibits guarantors from
receiving any credit for payments they individually make to lenders pursuant to the
guarantors' limited guarantees unless the lender first agrees to give the guarantor such
credit. Stanford contends that this rule should be reversed and is inapplicable to cases
where guarantors, not the borrowers, make payments to lenders on the limited guaranty.
The Parks defend the Court of Appeals' erroneous ruling by asserting that unless
they had previously agreed to give Stanford credit toward his personal guaranty for the
individual payments he made to them, the Parks were not obligated to give Stanford credit
toward his limited $500,000 guaranty for the $750,000 payments he made. Both the
Court of Appeals and the Parks are mistaken.
Stanford accepts the general rule that a third-party guarantor cannot control how a
lender chooses to apply a borrower's payment unless there is a specific agreement
regarding such application. See Lee v. Yano, 997 P.2d 68, 76 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000).
This rule has arisen from cases where a lender has two separate loans with the same
borrower only one of which is guaranteed by a third-party guarantor. See Id. The
1

borrower makes a single payment to the lender without specifying which loan the
payment covers and the guarantor attempts to dictate to the lender that the lender apply
the borrower's payment towards the loan the guarantor has guaranteed. See Id. In those
cases, Stanford acknowledges that sound policy dictates that a guarantor not be allowed
unilaterally to dictate how a lender applies a borrower's payment absent a previous
agreement between the lender and guarantor controlling such application. However,
those are not the facts of this case.
In this case, Stanford is seeking credit for payments that he, not the borrower
Snowmass, made to the Parks. Accordingly, the rule that a previous agreement governing
application of the guarantor's payments must exist in order to credit Stanford for his
payments is inapplicable under the facts of this case. There is no need to require a prior
agreement between the Parks and Stanford where Stanford is only seeking credit for his
payments and not Snowmass' payments. If Stanford had demanded that the Parks give
him credit towards his guaranty for Snowmass' payments, then the Court of Appeals'
requirement that the Parks and Stanford have an agreement calling for such application
would be appropriate. However, Stanford is not seeking credit for Snowmass' payments,
and the Court of Appeals' requirement that Stanford have an agreement with the Parks to
receive credit for his payments is therefore reversible errors
Monmouth Plumbing Supply Co. v. McDonald 147 A. 627 (NJ. 1929) is the only
case which the parties and the Court of Appeals cite which involves the same facts as the
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instant case and which answers the question of whether a guarantor should receive credit
towards his limited guaranty for payments the guarantor makes to the lender. The Court
of Appeals should have followed Monmouth's holding and adopted the general rule that a
guarantor should always receive credit for his payments to a lender pursuant to a limited
guaranty. Pursuant to Monmouth, Stanford more than extinguished his $500,000
guaranty by paying the Parks $750,000.
Moreover, courts have also held that when a guarantor makes a payment to a
lender, the lender is obligated to apply the guarantor's payment to the guaranteed debt.
See Wilson Leasing Co. v. Seaway Pharmacal Corp., 220 N.W.2d 83 (Mich. Ct. App.
1974)(holding that the portion of payment, which guarantors made pursuant to their
guarantees of two equipment leases, could not be applied to leases which were not
guaranteed.) And courts have expressly rejected the requirement that a guarantor must
request, and a lender subsequently agree, that the guarantor's payment be credited
towards his limited guaranty.
In Coxe Bros. & Co. v. Milbrath. 92 N.W. 560 (Wis. 1902), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that it was immaterial whether the guarantor instructed the lender to
apply his payment to the guaranty, or whether the lender and guarantor agreed, at the time
of making the guaranty, that all payments made on the borrower's account should be
applied to the guaranty. Likewise in this case, it is immaterial whether Stanford and the
Parks had an agreement as to how the Parks would apply Stanford's payments. The only

3

material facts are: (1) IA hether Stai lford. a s opposed to Snowmass, made payments to the
Parks and, (2) what were the amounts of Stanford's payments. In this case, the
undisputed facts are that Stanford paid the Parks approximately $750,000 and the Parks
should have therefore given Stanford credit lor those pas incuts.
The Park \ i »(e ;i list of cases in an attempt to support the Court of Appeals'
erroneous decision. Each case, however, involves a guarantor attempting to control a
lender's application of a borrower's payment. See Appellees' Op Br jt pp. S-in

I he

Parks cannot cite a single case where a coi ml lie. denied a gtiantiifui credit I'm .i pa>menl
he hii nself makes to a lei ider. Likewise, the Parks have not cited a single case, nor can
they, where a court has required a prior agreement between the guarantor and lender
before the lender gave the guarantor credit for the guarantors direct payments to the
lender. Instead, the Parks cite cases where courts have reiterated the general rule that a
lender has the right to choose how to apply a borrower's payment hoping this Court will
ignore this crucial factual distinction.
Moreover, to the extent the Court of Appeals required that Stanford aiid the Parks
have an agreement in place w 1 lerebj ! tl le Parks agreed to give Stanford credit towards his
limited guaranty for his individual payments to them, the court failed to recognize the
guaranty itself.
Pursuant to the guaranty, Stanford agreed to assume personal liability foi a
maximum,, amount of $500,000 id Snow mass" debt In Mum (he Parks agreed to credit

4

Stanford for his payments. Stanford upheld his responsibility pursuant to the guaranty.
The Parks did not. The guaranty constituted an agreement between Stanford and the
Parks which obligated the Parks to apply Stanford's personal payments towards his
limited guaranty liability. By refusing to give Stanford credit towards his personal
guaranty for the payments he made, the Parks breached the terms of the parties'
agreement and deprived Stanford of the benefit of his bargained for limited personal
guaranty. The Court of Appeals' decision in this case authorized the Parks' breach.
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error by refusing to give Stanford
credit towards his $500,000 guaranty for the $750,000 in payments he made to the Parks.
This error is rooted in the court's failure to recognize the critical factual difference that
Stanford is seeking credit for his own payments rather than credit for Snowmass'
payments. This distinction precludes the application of the rule that a guarantor must
have an agreement with a lender in order to receive credit for his payments.
II.

THERE WAS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT IN THIS
CASE AS TO WHETHER THE PARKS KNEW THAT STANFORD
WAS PAYING THEM OVER $750,000 IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SNOWMASS5 PERSONAL GUARANTOR

In his Opening Brief, Stanford cited the following facts which demonstrate that, at
the very least, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Parks knew that
Stanford had paid them $750,000 in his personal guarantor capacity. Stanford only paid
the Parks once Snowmass failed in its obligation to pay the Parks and after receiving a
written request for payment from the Parks. (R. at 160; 205-206; 211-261; 263-280.)
5

The Parks sent no fewer than twenty letters to Stanford and Buckway who were
Snowmass' guarantors. (R. 241-261.) The Parks' letters to Stanford and Buckway
demanding payment is the specific action a lender takes when the borrower has failed to
make a payment. In response to the demand letters, Stanford paid the Parks using
personal checks from his personal bank account rather than with Snowmass checks. (R.
270-273.) The Stanford personal checks are notice enough to the Parks that Stanford was
personally making the payments to them. Stanford wrote the notation "Gary Stanford" on
some of his checks to the Parks. (R. 274.) Stanford also stated that he believed the Parks
were applying his personal payments towards his personal guaranty. (R. 161; 207.)
Stanford stated that Mr. Park demanded Stanford pay him based on Stanford's personal
guaranty. (R. 205; 211-241)}
The Parks' only rebuttal to these facts is that Stanford was essentially the same
entity as Snowmass and that the parties agreed that the Parks could send notices of default
to Stanford at his personal address. Appellees' Op. Br. at pp. 14-15; 17. This argument,
however, ignores the fact that Snowmass was a viable business entity with its own
separate existence apart from Stanford. The Parks are asking the Court to conclude that

1

The Parks state that the only facts Stanford presented to the Court of Appeals
regarding his payments to the Parks came in his Opening Brief at paragraph 28 of
Stanford's Statement of Facts. This assertion is wrong. Pages 11-13 of Stanford's Reply
Brief to the Utah Court of Appeals enumerates the multiple facts which supported his
contention that the Parks knew he was paying them in his guarantor capacity. (Stanford
has attached these pages as Exhibit "A" in this Briefs Addendum.)
6

just because Stanford was Snowmass' only member, he is Snowmass' alter ego without
alleging any facts to support such a finding.
The fact that Stanford was Snowmass' only member does not mean that Stanford
and Snowmass were legally identical. Stanford never paid the Parks using Snowmass'
funds or using Snowmass' bank accounts. There is no evidence that Stanford ever
disregarded Snowmass' company form to benefit himself or others. The fact that
Stanford was Snowmass' lone member when he made a few payments to the Parks does
not support a grant of summary judgment in the Parks' favor.
Furthermore, the fact that the parties agreed that the Parks could send Stanford
notices of Snowmass' default to Stanford's home address has no bearing on the multitude
of facts which suggest the Parks were demanding payment from Stanford in his individual
capacity.
The Parks do not dispute that Stanford was a personal guarantor of Snowmass'
loan. The Parks do not dispute that Snowmass defaulted on its payment obligations to the
Parks. The Parks do not dispute that they sent Stanford notices of Snowmass' default
demanding payment. The Parks do not allege that they specifically addressed Stanford as
Snowmass' member as opposed to Snowmass' guarantor. The Parks do not dispute that
they received checks from Stanford's personal bank account. And the Parks do not
dispute Stanford's statement that he always anticipated the Parks would apply Stanford's
payments towards Stanford's personal guaranty. While Stanford may not have sent letters
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with his payments to the Parks asking that his payment be applied towards his guaranty,
the evidence demonstrates that, at the very least, a genuine issue of material fact existed
as to whether the Parks knew that Stanford was paying them in his guarantor capacity.

III. PUBLIC POLICY MANDATES THAT A LENDER BE REQUIRED
TO HONOR ITS CONTRACT WITH A GUARANTOR BY GIVING
THE GUARANTOR CREDIT FOR THE PAYMENTS HE MAKES
TO THE LENDER
The Court of Appeals' decision in this case will have a profoundly negative effect
on guarantors in this State. Denying guarantors credit for payments they make to a lender
unless they have a separate agreement calling for such credit will have a chilling effect on
lending practices in this State where lenders may not give credit to guarantors for
payments guarantors make to a lender.
The Parks contend that reversing the Court of Appeals' decision in this case will
be too burdensome on lenders because they will now have to take the time to look at
checks to see who is actually making the payments. The Parks allege that lending
institutions cannot be expected to look at the checks they receive to see whose account it
is drawn on. Appellees' Op. Br. at pg. 16.
Stanford contends that the minimal time it takes for a private lender to look at a
check and determine who the payment is from does not outweigh the harm to guarantors
who are now at increased risk of being liable for amounts far in excess of their
contractual obligation. Furthermore, in the case of guaranteed debts, a lender will always
examine a payment it receives to determine whether the borrower or guarantor is making
8

the payment. Lenders do not receive payments and simply guess who the payments are
from.
The Parks also argue that personal guarantors exist only to protect lenders.
Appellees' Op. Br. at 16. The courts ought to balance the rights of the parties to a
guaranty as well as honor the terms of the contract itself. Stanford contends that crediting
guarantors for payments they make to lenders strikes the proper balance between
protecting the lenders' interests as well as those of guarantors. This is not a case where
Stanford is advocating a rule which allows guarantors in this State the right to dictate how
lenders apply a borrower's payment.
The Parks' contention that the Parks could have denied Stanford credit for his
payments to them even if they had an agreement in place highlights the problem with the
Court of Appeals' decision. The Parks argue that "at a minimum [Stanford] had a legal
obligation to advise Parks [sic] that the payments being made to them were to be credited
against his guarantee, and obtain their consent to this request" Appellees' Op. Br. at pg.
15 (emphasis added).
The Parks therefore argue that Stanford not only had to ask their permission to
make payments to them in his guarantor capacity, but that the Parks could actually deny
this request by not giving their consent. Accordingly, the Parks advocate a rule of law in
this State which would allow a lender simply to refuse to apply a guarantor's payment
towards his guaranty even if the guarantor asked that the payment be so applied. Taken to
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its logical conclusion, a lender could choose never to give her consent to a guarantor's
request that the lender apply his payment towards his guaranty and a guarantor could
therefore never extinguish his limited maximum guaranty liability regardless of the
amount of money he paid pursuant to the guaranty. Such a practice is not acceptable and
would be unfair to guarantors.
The Parks ask this Court not only to affirm a rule which is inapplicable to the facts
of this case, but also to authorize a lender's right never to credit a guarantor for payments
he makes pursuant to his guaranty. Policy concerns certainly disfavor such a rule and
support this Court's reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Stanford respectfully asks this Court to reverse the
Court of Appeals' decision.
DATED this ty* day of June, 2010.
WOODBURY & KESLER, P . C

RusselTS^ Walker;
Reid W. Lambert
Anthony M. Grover
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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would at times transfer his own personal funds into Snowmass' bank account so that
Snowmass could make its monthly payment to the Parks. (R. 159.) Accordingly,
Stanford should have received credit for those payments which Snowmass made using
Stanford's money.
The Parks' theory that there is no "equitable exception'* to justify giving Stanford
credit for the payments he made to the Parks fails where Stanford made payments to the
Parks in his capacity as guarantor and where Stanford was also the source of funds which
Snowmass used to pay the Parks.

2.

Stanford has alleged that the Parks knew the payments they
received came from him in his capacity as guarantor

The Parks knew the payments they received from Stanford were based on his
status as guarantor of Snowmass. The law is clear that when a lender knows the source of
funds she receives is from a guarantor, the lender must give the guarantor credit for such
payments. See United States v. Franchi Bros. Construction Corp.. 378 F.2d 134, 139 (2d
Cir. 1967)(stating that when a creditor knows the surety is the source of funds it receives
from a debtor, the creditor must apply those funds to the guaranteed debt); Ash Grove
Lime & Portland Cement Co. v. Moran Construction Co., 296 N.W. 761 (Neb. 1941)
(holding that a lender must apply a debtor's payment to guaranteed debt if the lender
knows that the guarantor is the source of those funds.) In this case, the facts demonstrate
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the Parks knew that Stanford was the source of over $750,000.00 in payments to them,
and therefore the Parks should have given Stanford credit for those payments.
Snowmass was often delinquent with its monthly payments to the Parks. (R. 1.)
Once Snowmass was behind on its payments, Mr. Park would contact Stanford requesting
that he honor his guarantee and make the payments on behalf of Snowmass. (R. 205;
241-261.) The record contains twenty separate letters that Mr. Park wrote to Snowmass9
guarantors, Stanford and Buckway, demanding immediate payments. (R. 241-261.) In
each of those letters, Mr. Park addressed Stanford and Buckway who were the guarantors
of the loan rather than Snowmass who was the obligor. (R. 241-261.)
While it is true that Mr. Park did not specifically address Stanford and Buckway as
"guarantors" in his letters, the only conceivable reason he would address his letters to
them personally, rather than to Snowmass, was to demand payment from them
individually because they were the guarantors. The Parks' letters to Stanford and
Buckway demanding payment is exactly the type of action one takes when an obligor has
failed to make a payment, the creditor demands payment from the guarantors.
Furthermore, when Stanford sent payments to the Parks he often did so using his
personal checks, rather than checks drawn on Snowmass5 bank account. (R. 270-273.) A
few of the checks Stanford sent were cashier's checks which included the notation "Gary
Stanford" on the check. (R. 274.) One of the cashier's checks made payable to Mr. Park
had the notation "Snowmass Highland/ Dr. Stanford." (R. 275.) And one check just had
the notation "Snowmass" on it. (R. 276.) These checks, none of which was drawn on a
11

Snowmass account, weakens any argument the Parks have made that they had no idea that
over $750,000.00 in payments came from Stanford as a guarantor.
The fact that Mr. Park sent Stanford and Buckway a letter each time Snowmass
was delinquent with its payment is evidence that the Parks were demanding payment from
Stanford as a guarantor. The fact that Stanford sent money to the Parks using his own
personal checks rather than Snowmass checks is evidence that the Parks knew Stanford
was paying them as a guarantor. Stanford has also alleged that Mr. Park demanded that
Stanford pay him based on Stanford's personal guarantee. (R. 205; 211-241.) The
cumulative effect of these facts is that the Parks knew the payments they received from
Stanford came from him in his capacity as an individual guarantor, not on behalf of
Snowmass.
Where this Court must view "the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable" to Stanford, there is at the very least a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether the Parks did in fact know that Stanford was paying them as
Snowmass' guarantor. See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, f 6, 177 P.3d 600. Given this
genuine issue of fact, this Court may remand this case to the District Court with
instructions to resolve this issue.
II.

STANFORD'S GUARANTEE AMOUNT IN THE JULY TRUST
DEED IS AMBIGUOUS

The District Court erred by awarding the Parks a judgment against Stanford which
included $500,000.00 in principal and $508,463.91 in interest on that principal amount.
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